This chapter studies the economics of defense in Israel, focusing on the effect of defense-related shocks on the economy from 1990 to 2016. This period includes several important defense-related shocks, such as the Oslo Accords, the Second Palestinian Uprising (Intifada), the disengagement from Gaza, the Second Lebanon War, and the massive rocket attacks from Gaza on Israel. The chapter examines the effects of these shocks – and compares them to the effects of other types of shocks – on the economy from the perspective of participants in the stock market and the foreign exchange market. The analysis shows that relative to the first part of the period (1990–2005), in the second (2005–2016) security-related shocks, and especially those associated with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, had a much weaker effect on the stock market and the foreign exchange market, while external economic shocks had a much stronger effect. A similar pattern is observed in the behavior of additional variables examined. Analysis of survey data suggest a possible explanation for the diminished effect of security-related shocks, specifically those associated with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: following the Second Intifada (2000–2005), the public ceased to believe that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict may be resolved peacefully in the near future.
This book describes and analyzes developments in the Israeli economy from 1995 to 2017. During this period, inflation was vanquished, the deficit in the balance of payments turned into a surplus, the public debt to GDP ratio sharply decreased, and unemployment declined to an historical low. Nevertheless, the economy still suffers from many maladies: the productivity level is among the lowest in the developed world, and inequality has generally been on the rise. In the face of these threats to future growth and social cohesiveness, the question arises: has the reliance on market forces gone too far, and has the government retreated from its traditional tasks, tasks the private sector cannot (or does not) perform.
Scapegoating -- attributing inordinate blame for a negative outcome to a target individual or group -- is considered an important driver of discrimination by psychologists, but has received little attention by economists. This paper helps fill the gap by providing evidence for scapegoating in a natural setting. Using data on three million driving tests held in Israel, I find that an increase in the number of unrelated traffic accident fatalities leads driving testers to discriminate against out-group students. Scapegoating characterizes all groups of testers -- Jewish and Arab, male and female -- and works to increase ethnic in-group bias and decrease gender out-group bias.